The most widely used (and taught) protocols for strategic analysis-Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) and Porter's (1980) Five Force Framework for industry analysis-have been found to be insufficient as stimuli for strategy creation or even as a basis for further strategy development. We approach this problem from a neurocognitive perspective. We see profound incompatibilities between the cognitive process-deductive reasoning-channeled into the collective mind of strategists within the formal planning process through its tools of strategic analysis (i.e., rational technologies) and the essentially inductive reasoning process actually needed to address ill-defined, complex strategic situations. Thus, strategic analysis protocols that may appear to be and, indeed, are entirely rational and logical are not interpretable as such at the neuronal substrate level where thinking takes place. The analytical structure (or propositional representation) of these tools results in a mental dead end, the phenomenon known in cognitive psychology as functional fixedness. The difficulty lies with the inability of the brain to make out meaningful (i.e., strategy-provoking) stimuli from the mental images (or depictive representations) generated by strategic analysis tools. We propose decreasing dependence on these tools and conducting further research employing brain imaging technology to explore complex data handling protocols with richer mental representation and greater potential for strategy creation.
business strategy. Nevertheless, the application of purportedly rational tools, techniques, protocols, models, or frameworks to the problem of new strategy formation appears to be overwhelmingly ineffectual. Few, if any, organizations actually achieve a new or revised strategy from such efforts. When the genesis of a dramatic change in an organization's objectives and strategies finally is tracked down, it invariably is the result of an informal process that usually is not unrelated to the formal planning effort itself.
This serious failure of formal planning has been well known, if not fully understood, for some time, and was documented more than 25 years ago. Indeed, some reputable scholars in the field recommended at the time that new strategy formation not be attempted through the formal planning process. New or revised strategy had been observed in a variety of large organizations to successfully evolve incrementally independent of the formal planning processes. Hence, these scholars suggested that this was the appropriate way for an organization to adopt a new strategic direction. 1 Currently, there is no evidence that corporations are consciously employing logical incrementalism as a means for new strategy formation. Rather, formal strategic planning continues to be an integral activity in most large organizations, employing essentially the same techniques of strategic analysis used a generation ago. 2 There is some evidence that expectations of the formal strategic planning process have diminished even as it continues to be conventionally practiced. More recently, some major corporations have reoriented the planning process toward addressing specific strategic issues to reach finite decisions. 3 Others have restructured the formal planning protocol to raise awareness concerning the factors and issues management must consider in addressing the more amorphous, less structured strategy formation task, "to build prepared minds that are capable of making sound decisions." 4 Unfortunately, the strategic analysis protocols at hand-what James March has called rational technologies-for "preparing" these minds are sorely lacking. 5 There is little, if any, evidence that the current techniques perform as they are supposed to, namely, by leading to new strategies, inspiring or stimulating the minds of decisionmakers in new strategic directions, or triggering new strategic insights. If anything, the opposite tends to occur: the greater the attempt to "rationalize" the process, the greater the reliance on strategic analysis techniques within the planning system and the greater the attempt to formalize the process; and the greater the formalization of the planning process, the less "out-of-the-box" thinking can be anticipated. 6 We believe that there is yet a far more fundamental basis for the inefficacy a of formal strategic planning efforts, one that goes well beyond behavioral, process, and other explanations. This phenomenon results from profound incompatibilities between the cognitive process-deductive reasoning-channeled into the collective mind of strategists within the formal planning process through its tools of strategic analysis (i.e., rational technologies) and the essentially inductive reasoning process actually needed to address ill-defined, complex situations. Thus, strategic analysis protocols that may appear to be and, indeed, are entirely logical are not interpretable as such by the processing end of the brain, the neuronal substrate level where thinking takes place. The difficulty lies with the inability of the brain to detect meaningful (i.e., strategy-provoking) stimuli from the mental models (or mental visualizations) evoked by strategic analysis protocols.
In this paper, we focus on what are, arguably, the most ubiquitous strategic analysis techniques, Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) Analysis 7 and Porter's Five Force Framework (FFF) 8 (see Exhibit 1 for a series of links to SWOT Analysis and FFF definitions and applications). Not only have these approaches been widely used and taught internationally, but these constructs still are foundational to current strategic analysis proposals 9 and pedagogy. Both of these "tools of rational analysis" can be found and recommended (to varying degrees) for use in each of the four top selling strategic management texts, which account for more than half of the market. [10] [11] [12] [13] Using these two pillars of strategic planning exercises, we show why strategic response cannot derive directly from performance of such analyses, and why these techniques do not and cannot trigger the creative act of making or revising strategy. The problem lies with the actual and implied cognitive processes conveyed by these techniques, and the mental model representations (or "mental imagery") that these evoke in the mind of the decisionmaker.
PLAN OF THE PAPER
First, we discuss the various activities that comprise the rubric of strategic planning. We clarify the key contextual differences between new strategy creation, what we define here as a strategic situation (SS), and making strategic decisions (SDs). Next, we summarize the perceived major inadequacies of formal strategic planning and analysis technology as conveyed by leading organization scholars as well as the very limited empirical data available on the utility of both SWOT Analysis and the FFF. Then, we identify the cognitive interpretations-what appears in "the mind's eye"-indicated by the structure of these analytical approaches; in other words, the mental imagery evoked by these techniques and how this limits cognitive processing.
Efficacy is an assessment of the capability (or capacity) of an activity to accomplish an objective or achieve an aim. As we are concerned here with the appropriateness of processes and techniques of analysis, our focus is the latter-what we shall call neurocognitive efficacy. Or the lack of it, inefficacy. Next, some key neurobiological concepts that underlie strategic thinking (and all thinking) will be presented to explain this mental impasse. And, because thinking and problem solving are inextricably tied to memory, we identify some important neurocognitive aspects of memory activity and mental imagery that are relevant to inductive, strategic thinking. In light of this discussion, we then suggest why SWOT and the FFF, even when used correctly, are not supportive of the creative act of strategy making and how the mental representations these tools evoke must be reinterpreted by the brain to make strategic sense.
SWOT & FFF EXAMPLES AND APPLICATIONS…

DISTINGUISHING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION FROM STRATEGIC DECISIONMAKING
The terms strategy formation, strategic planning, strategic decisionmaking, and strategy selection are used casually, often interchangeably, to denote different contexts and applications. Strategic decisionmaking typically is used to refer to the contexts that are most easily categorized. In such cases, the decision issue in question is reasonably clear-in the important sense that it is commonly understood by decisionmakers-as are the alternatives (or choices) available. Significance alone does not make any particular decision "strategic" in nature. The decision could be in the context of a complex environment in which the external forces normally relevant may be in flux or where some ambiguity may exist in the attributes of the choices; most importantly, the decision could alter the way the company conducts its business (i.e., its strategy). However, the conceit is that common, measurable outcomes can be determined (qualitatively or quantitatively) from each of the choices. Such SDs are tangible and constrained to one immediate purpose or goal (but could have broad company-wide effects), about which there is substantial agreement among involved parties.
Although there is not a universally accepted definition of an SD, there is a sense that, in any one organization, decisionmakers will be in reasonably common agreement as to what constitutes such a decision. A recent examination of strategic decisionmaking effectiveness using different decision processes provides some examples of SDs: a chemical company that enters the sealant business; a company that closes an overseas electronics manufacturing plant; a lighting company that creates a European office; and an electronics company that adopts a new compensation system.
14 From an analytical standpoint, although these decisions were culled from a variety of companies in different industries, they have a number of characteristics in common: (i) extensive past experience and rationality could be brought to bear on the decision process; (ii) nothing is inherently unique about these decisions, however strategically important they might be; (iii) the actions (opening a foreign office, installing a new compensation system, closing a plant, etc.) are themselves generic; and (iv) the factors that would be considered in making such decisions are well known. If not previously addressed by the individual decisionmaker, the factors considered in making the decision could be determined easily by examining the experience of others faced with this same type of decision. In other words, the use of a rational, analytical process-a deductive reasoning protocol-would be indicated.
In contrast, we have the SS, a commonplace of corporate-level management in the midst of turbulent environments. Here, the decisionmakers are confronted by a situation b at the outset of unknown scope, potentially affecting a large number of organizational decisions, activities, or both. Previously disparate decisions or activities may need to be coordinated and collectively agreed upon. A multitude of relevant extrinsic factors, events, conditions (possibly causally or casually, directly or indirectly related) affecting decisions and activities may need to be addressed or reevaluated because of dramatic changes in a business environment that is in a constant state of flux with no prospect for stability in sight. Nor is it clear which decisions among many specifically need to be addressed or reevaluated immediately, coordinated, or examined in what order or priority. Thus, defining the SS is itself a problem, one arrived at using a good deal of inductive reasoning.
Consider the "War on Terror." Can one, even at this stage, clearly identify the particular decisions-and the specific alternative courses of action-that must be made in response to this "war?" What are the final objectives in fighting this war? Could we define "winning" clearly enough so that we would know if and when this goal has been achieved? Will some adverse set of circumstances for which we have a studied response remain constant long enough for a rehearsed action to be effective? What about some unanticipated terrorist action or other disaster? Which actions need to be taken, or decisions made, immediately? How should the subsequent decisions or actions be prioritized? Which decisions or actions must be coordinated? What ought to be the specific objectives of proposed actions?
At the inception of the Department of Homeland Security, the US federal government released a chart showing 123 federal entities (e.g., agencies, offices, and departments) that were somehow involved in domestic US security and, presumably, in the war as well. 15 Each of these was connected to at least one other security-related organizational unit; a number of entities had several such relationships. This number does not include the thousands of state and local agencies whose resources and mandates similarly are related to some form of homeland security. One can only imagine how much reconfiguration in these arrangements would have to take place when they are confronted by an unanticipated catastrophic event. An ambiguous, complex situation, indeed! Where does one even start? How does the collective mind of the organizations' decisionmakers, in this case the US government, encompass this situation? This is hardly is a hypothetical situation; one early attempt to grasp the situation was reported in the New York Times on April 28, 2004: 16 b The term situation is used here to convey the lack of distinct boundaries to the problem at hand, where at its initial consideration there is no clear, or even approximate, idea how to formulate, structure, or model the problem-what March characterized as a complex situation. 5 Soon after the Sept. 11 [2001] attacks, a two-man intelligence team set up shop in a windowless, cipher-locked room at the Pentagon, searching for evidence of links between terrorist groups and host countries.
The men culled classified material, much of it uncorroborated data from the C.I.A. . . They recorded and annotated their evidence on butcher paper hung like a mural around their small office. By the end of the year. . . the men had constructed a startling new picture of global terrorism. Presumably, these high-level Department of Defense officials had at their disposal the latest, state-of-the-art, rational technologies for addressing the situation. Yet they required more than two months-and, of course, plenty of butcher paper-to assemble their "picture" of the problem.
The War on Terror as an example of an SS is not unique. In fact, it mirrors the corporate strategic planning situation closely. Klein was able to examine the results of a comprehensive strategic planning effort performed within a major electric utility company in the early 1990s-a single company, albeit large, producing essentially one product. This effort was provoked by the passage of federal legislation that effectively would deregulate the electric utility industry during the ensuing decade, thereby completely changing the prospective competitive landscape and the company's existing way of doing business (i.e., the utility's existing strategy). In the span of a decade, the entire electric utility industry would move from being a large group of local, independent, regulated monopolies to a smaller number of consolidated national competitors. This radical industry restructuring would take place concurrently with other major changes in the business environment. Klein found that the company's management identified no fewer than 34 SD issues and activities (e.g., generating capacity, fuel mix, demand side management, transmission type and requirements, central vs. local generation, and pricing) that required reconsideration. A company-wide, extensive environmental assessment, engaging more than 100 company employees supplemented by a variety of outside experts and consultants, yielded about 70 extrinsic factors, forces, and issues that were either directly or indirectly relevant to the aforementioned decisions. 17 In a similar, but even more extensive, strategy reassessment conducted by an international petroleum company for its US subsidiary, more than 90 SD issues, activities, and functions were identified, along with well over 250 relevant external factors-an even more complex SS. In both the electric utility and petroleum company situations, the initial objectives of their respective planning exercises were not the creation of new strategies, but the identification of which decisions had to be made, the state of the relevant external factors that impinged upon the identified decisions, and the types of action the respective companies could take to moderate prospective adverse events.
EFFICACY OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES-EVIDENCE AND ASSESSMENT
Evidence
Empirical research to establish the efficacy of strategic analysis techniques and their contribution to strategy formation is practically nonexistent. Many studies have examined the perceived value of formal planning systems and analytical tools, some with favorable results and others unfavorable. In virtually all of these studies, the measure of value or effectiveness has been subjective (the ex post facto assessment either of an observer of the situation under study or of the decisionmaking participants themselves). For example, Sinha's large-sample survey of Fortune 500 companies and their use of formal strategic analysis tools for specific SDs (i.e., strategic programming) found that these tools were positively valued. 19 In contrast, Bresser and Bishop's meta-assessment of the use of formal protocols for strategic planning (i.e., strategy formation) found contradictory results among the empirical studies undertaken. 20 The utility of rational analytical techniques for addressing specific SDs seemed to be supported, when compared with the use of political processes, in a 1996 study.
14 A more recent, (2003) in-depth examination of corporate-level, strategic planning practice among eight major international oil companies revealed their shift away from strategy formation within the formal planning process (an explicit acknowledgement of the inability of the formal process to generate new strategy). The focus was found to be broad goal setting and consideration of major specific SDs. Strategic planning was devolved to individual divisions. In this research effort, as with virtually all others attempting to measure or otherwise evaluate the worth of formal planning processes and rational techniques, the raw data were personal assessments-the views and experiences of managers who participated in the planning process under study. 21 Remarkably, it appears that only one extensive, systematic examination exists of the actual results of a standardized application of a strategic analysis tool or technique. Hill and Westbrook gained access to the results of the formal strategic planning efforts of 20 UK manufacturing companies. Thanks to a UK government-funded effort to encourage and facilitate the use of rational planning and decisionmaking practices, a series of professional consultants were teamed with the managements of 14 of the 20 companies to assist them in conducting a formal strategic planning process, following exactly the same protocol. One step, in each case, was the performance of a SWOT Analysis. In their examination of the strategic planning results, Hill and Westbrook did not find a single company among the 20 for which the SWOT results were used at all in subsequent steps of the planning exercises. They concluded that the use of SWOT Analysis should be discontinued.
Porter's (1980) FFF has not faired much better. The operational difficulties in applying the framework were identified soon after its publication, 23 and these weaknesses have not been resolved. 24 Both techniques, it has been argued, convey no notion of a temporal dimension in competitive dynamics, induce cross-sectional thinking, are vague as to the application of results even within the purported analytical framework, and have no discernable relevance for strategy implementation. To date, no study has been performed, comparable to that of Hill and Westbrook's, that examines the effectiveness of the FFF. This is surprising-and dismaying in light of its stellar position within the strategic management firmament.
Assessment
More than a decade ago, Mintzberg conducted what is, perhaps, the most extensive and thoughtful examination of the causes for failure of formal strategic planning systems and strategic analysis techniques. He concluded that planning is an analytical exercise, but strategy creation is synthesis. Strategy will derive from other, more informal activities, but not from the process itself, which is more appropriate for strategic programming-the "codification, elaboration and conversion" of strategies into detailed, implementable plans. The clearer a stated strategy-what you want done and essentially how you ought to do it-the greater the likelihood that it can and will be implemented.
Mintzberg concluded, apparently correctly, that strategy is the product of "right-side of the brain" thinking, and analysis (which he deemed planning) is a "left-side of the brain" activity. Hence, corporate planners should revert to a facilitating function and act as catalysts for some "black box" whence strategy will emerge (where the black box is presumably the collective mind of the corporate strategic managers). Clearly, different thinking processes are involved in analysis and synthesis. 25 Others have come to similar conclusions. 26 Most recently (2006), James March, a founder of the field of organizational science, has seriously questioned the very utility of "the core technologies of strategic management." That is, the strategic analysis techniques at the heart of strategic planning processes, what March variously refers to as rational technologies, techniques of model-based rationality, or analytical tools. He concludes that there is no evidentiary basis for believing that these supposed analytical techniques are capable of addressing complex strategic problems. It is useful to mention March's summarization of the difficulties that contribute to the "misspecification of situations," diminishing the applicability of strategic analysis techniques: (i) uncertainty about the attributes of the situation; (ii) causal complexity-the many interdependencies among situation variables; (iii) confound of measurability and importance-the tendency of analysts to give more weight to measurable variables than more-difficult-to-measure ones; (iv) preference ambiguity-the indeterminacy of values and utilities of action; (v) interpersonal trade-offs-the difficulty of determining combinatorial preferences of situation participants; and (vi) strategic interaction-the causal interdependency of action-reaction among organizations. March notes the apparently total confidence of strategic management scholars in the ultimate utility of rational analytic techniques for addressing a complex SS and offers a concise description of this phenomenon: "The Heroism of Fools."
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STRATEGIC ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES APPLIED-IN THE MIND'S EYE
The formalized steps in the comprehensive strategic planning rubric (or the strategic management or the strategy process) are well known and have been accepted for decades as a variant of the rational decisionmaking model. The nomenclature may vary, but the essentials of the steps are the same: (i) set organizational objectives; (ii) conduct an environmental assessment (internal to the organization and external to it); (iii) form or revise a strategy; (iv) implement a strategy through such actions as organization structure redesign, resource allocations for operational programs, complementary management information and other internal systems development, adjustment of the organization's reward system, etc.; (v) enact strategic control by monitoring and analyzing feedback of the organization's performance in relation to its goals; and, finally, (vi) take timely corrective action in response to observed deviations in desired performance. In situations where it is obvious to the collective management that the organization is confronting major external environmental change, and where the likelihood is high that the organization will need to revise significantly its existing strategy or devise a new one if it is to survive, the environmental assessment step is performed first, in place of objective-setting. Surprisingly, the essential tools of strategic analysis that are used in each of the steps have not changed materially during the last 20 years or so. Often, the most critical step in the formal strategic planning process-the environmental assessment step, which provides the stimulus or impetus for strategic response-is comprised largely of the FFF, variants of a SWOT Analysis, or both (see Exhibit 1) .
The essence of the FFF is conveyed visually by means of the five-force diagram, in which "industry rivalry" is at the hub, surrounded equidistantly by the four external "forces" impacting the industry; visually, the FFF is a hub-force with four spokes, or forces. Each of the latter four rather general forces (i.e., the power of buyers, the power of suppliers, the threat of substitute products, and the threat of new entrants) is, in turn, comprised of a series of more specific forces, easily from 5 to 10 or more. Thus, the force, "supplier power" might comprise: (i) supplier concentration; (ii) importance of volume to supplier; (iii) differentiation of inputs; (iv) impact of inputs on cost or differentiation; (v) switching costs of firms in the industry; (vi) presence of substitute inputs; (vii) threat of forward integration; and (viii) cost relative to total purchases in industry. Any robust FFF for an industry could have 25 to 30 or more individual forces impinging on the "industry rivalry" force (the hub) which, itself, comprises 10 or so industry attributes.
The most commonly encountered variant of a so-called SWOT Analysis is a series of verbal statements organized into four distinct groups, classified according to the sense of the SWOT acronym (i.e., a series of simple or annotated statements listing strengths, another listing of weaknesses, and so on). The relevance of any list item is not usually stated explicitly; nor is there indication visually or otherwise of any interdependency or connection of items within a list or among lists. Hence, the SWOT representation simply consists of four lists with varying degrees of detail for each item.
MENTAL VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF SWOT AND FFF CONSTRUCTS
From a cognitive perspective, both approaches have important similarities despite apparently different representations. Both SWOT and the FFF convey the notion of a number of issues, variables, or forces simultaneously and mutually exclusively affecting something: the former implied, usually the "corporation"; the latter quite explicitly, the "industry." In the case of SWOT, four sets of items are developed, where each item either is descriptive of the organization (in the case of Ss and Ws) or relevant to the organization (in the case of Os and Ts).
One can only surmise, but with some confidence, how the mind frames the problem conceptually in statement form, the propositional mental (verbal) image or its visualization, the depictive mental (visual) image. 27 For both tools, the structure of relationships (or lack thereof) is clearly explicit. In recognition of the vagaries of SWOT, at times the strengths and weaknesses might be individually arrayed opposite the opportunities and threats, creating four setsSOs, WOs, STs, and WTs-this has been termed a TOWS Analysis. 28 This reconfiguration of the four sets of items into two pairwise sets purportedly overcomes the deficiencies of the SWOT Analysis. But does it? With the TOWS arrangement, depending on the richness of the imagination or recall in generating the original SWOT lists, one is confronted by a set of apparently mutually exclusive paired items of indeterminate number (each application would yield different results and pair relationships). A responsive strategy would have to be created for each pair. No protocol is provided to address these multiple paired relationships.
The FFF need not be imagined, as the construct always is presented pictorially as a hub with four spokes, arranged in the appearance of the face of a compass. Similarly, SWOT simply consists of four lists, sometimes shown in vertical sequential order and other times depicted in a four-quadrant square with the strength list opposite the weakness list and, below, the opportunity list opposite the threat list. As indicated above, the relevance (i.e., rationale) for any one item's presence on any of the four lists can only be inferred as there is no explicit indication from the visual representation itself.
Exhibit 2 provides generalized representations of the propositional and depictive mental images of both SWOT and the FFF. Schematic A should be recognizable as the general case of the FFF, except that it is here shown with six nodes (or "forces") connected to a central node, or hub ("industry rivalry" in the case of the FFF). Schematic B is a list of nodes, all commonly connected to another node; this might be an interpretation of, say, the "strengths" of the firm, where the firm is the single node to which the other six are connected. A comprehensive visualization of SWOT might be four such lists. It should be evident that both Schematics A and B are identical structurally, both from a propositional and depictive standpoint! In essence, these propositional and depictive mental images (Exhibit 2, Schematics A, B) are the verbal and diagrammatic analogues, respectively, of a linear, multiple regression equation, but without coefficients and with a vague dependent variable (the corporation or the industry). And that might very well be the mental model evoked in the mind of an economist. Someone else, such as a business analyst, indoctrinated in the applicability of the FFF, more likely would envisage a bicycle wheel arrangement. But, again, analytically these are one and the same problem constructs.
ARRIVING AT A MENTAL DEAD END-THE FUNCTIONAL FIXEDNESS PROBLEM
There are two difficulties with the SWOT and FFF representations: (1) they do not jibe with reality; and (2) the mind cannot possibly process these problem representations as given (i.e., depictive schematics A or B in Exhibit 2). Neither the SWOT nor the FFF representation conveys any temporal or serial quality of the arrayed forces, factors, or issues. 29, 30 All forces, in fact, do not act simultaneously, nor are these mutually exclusive of one another; they are highly interdependent and, often, causally related but not in a quantitatively describable fashion. And, while an econometric model exercised on a computer can handle multiple factors simultaneously (given the appropriate input data), the human mind, at the conscious level, does not and, more importantly, cannot execute that task. c c That is, for high-level cognitive tasks (e.g., strategic thinking). We routinely do two things at once, but not two complex cognitive tasks where each demands our individual attention. One can hold a conversation while driving a car, the latter a highly complex cognitive task but one that, over time, can become automatic. But holding a conversation while watching television is difficult for most people to do; we end up switching our attention between these two activities in serial, sequential fashion.
DEPICTIVE MENTAL IMAGES A B A & B ALL EIGHT FAC TORS/NODES SIMULTAN EOUSLY AND/0R COMMONLY IMPACT OR CREATE ANOTHER NODE C TWO PAIRS OF NODES MUTUALLY INDEPENDENT OF EACH OTHER IMPACT OR CREATE TWO OTHER NODES. THE RESULTING TWO NODES IMPA CT OR CREATE ANOTHER NODE
PROPOSITIONAL MENTAL IMAGES C EXHIBIT 2. Generalized mental imagery of SWOT and FFF: depictive and propositional.
Exacerbating the cognitive problem is the use of the terms "analysis" with SWOT (i.e., "SWOT Analysis") and "model" with the FFF, where the FFF is referred to loosely as the "Five Force Model" as opposed to the "Five Force Framework." Porter himself has been careful to make the distinction between the attributes of a model and a framework. The latter is conceived of as a more robust construct in theory building, inclusive of more variables, and more complex. It does not need to meet the criterion of application, as it is not intended for that purpose. A model has fewer variables, is less comprehensive, and is more appropriate for hypothesis testing. 31 But when the FFF is dubbed the "Five Force Model" does it not suggest to the planner that an analytic application is called for? And does it not also create the expectation of simultaneous consideration of the relevant forces affecting the industry? In the case of SWOT lists, does "analysis" imply that the variety of positive and negative organization attributes (strengths and weaknesses, respectively) need to be considered in responding to the positives and negatives of the prospective environment (opportunities and threats, respectively) or collectively considered in developing a company strategy?
Here, the semantics (the propositional representation) and the visualization (the depictive representation) together channel the brain toward attempting an analytical, deductive solution. Additionally, there is the reinforcing effect of being exposed repeatedly to the notion that the use of SWOT or the FFF is an "analysis" that will lead to strategic revelations. The ubiquitous nature of SWOT and the FFF in business school classrooms and in planning practice would seem to assure their status as what cognitive psychologists refer to as frames or scripts-routines, heuristics, and memorized procedures for addressing particular problems. 32 Figuratively, and perhaps literally speaking, these mental constructs have been "hard-wired," into the psyche of the strategic analyst and decisionmaker.
But what can the mind do with these mental models? The FFF provides no clue as to how to handle the identified forces, either in relation to each other or to the industry. In the case of SWOT, the problem of model construction is worse still, as there is no dependent variable, however ambiguous, upon which to focus the items in each of the SWOT lists, and there are no constraints on what can be included or omitted from these lists. 30 Other versions of SWOT, such as TOWS, that attempt to add some structure and simplification (i.e., S-W or O-T pairwise constructs), only add a different type of ambiguity to the problem: Are the pairwise relationships mutually exclusive? If they are not, how are they related? How can these relationships be expressed in an objective manner? And what does one do with these anyway?
Obviously, something useful. A recent (2006) assessment of the "big ideas" in strategic thinking-those that have stood the test of time and practiceidentified four "new, sharper analytical tools that help managers make better sense of their markets, competitors, and industries." SWOT and the FFF (referred to as "industry structure") were included along with "product life cycle" and "market segmentation."
2 But recall that the UK study, the only empirical assessment of the actual use of SWOT analysis results as inputs to strategy formation, found no indication that the SWOT lists were used subsequently in the identification or creation of new or revised strategy. Neither SWOT nor the FFF provide any further problem-solving heuristics beyond the potential trigger to memory embedded in the list items themselves. Hence, the output from these two "analyses"-essentially lists-in some manner act as extrinsic stimuli, raising different problem-solving heuristics to the conscious level; alternatively, these analyses are mentally discarded and the problem addressed anew.
From a neurocognitive perspective, SWOT or the FFF sets up an insoluble problem for the brain-a mental dead end. There are no instructions, no protocol, and no practiced analytical approach provided; each application is unique. There is no prescribed way, and no script in the analyst's mind, to examine simultaneously two or more of the five forces and their multiple components or the dozens of items on the SWOT lists. If the analyst is fixated on the mental model evoked by the FFF or SWOT, there is no way for the brain to proceed (recall the criticism above).
What appears to result is the functional fixedness effect, 33 or mental fixation: 34 unless what is construed as an analytical problem is mentally reconfigured, it cannot be solved. 35 If, indeed, functional fixedness is taking place (it can only be inferred from observation alone), the original mental model (i.e., the FFF or SWOT) is more or less discarded. In the absence of any further analytical guidance, the mind presumably falls back on prior experience (i.e., memory) in dealing with such situations. In laboratory functional fixedness experiments, once a subject is shown how to reframe the problem, the subject most often can solve it easily.
d But in such controlled experiments, there always is a correct and finite solution. It is possible to measure the exact time it takes to reach a solution under both conditions, or whether a solution is reached at all. 34, 36 There are no comparable objective measures with the application of SWOT or the FFF. There are no generalized follow-on protocols extant for coping with the various FFF-generated forces or the items on SWOT lists.
In effect, every strategy formation exercise is a novel one, requiring, anew, the integration of prior knowledge and experience with new extrinsic stimuli d A classic functional fixedness experiment is to provide a subject with a box of matches, a candle, and a tack. The problem is to affix the lit candle to a wall. If the match box itself is seen as one of the objects that can be used in solving the problem, then the solution is readily obtained: empty the box of the matches; tack the box to the wall, creating a shelf; light the candle with one of the matches; and place the lit candle on the side of the box protruding from the wall. If the subject doesn't see the box as a separate object to be used, but simply as a container for the matches, either the problem will not be solved or it will take materially longer. Hence, the term functional fixedness or mental fixation: a subject is "fixated" on the function of an object, in this case a match box, and does not consider an alternative use for it. Once the subject is made aware that the box itself may be used in performing the task, it is quickly completed. that trigger associations in the mind of the strategist. It should be expected that novices in the use of these "analytical tools" would have difficulty in their application. However, continued exposure to examples of their application (as in the classroom through case studies), along with practice in attempting to apply the tools themselves, appears to provide egress from the encountered mental dead ends, a process that might appear seamless to the observer.
Consequently, for the SWOT or FFF results to prove useful in the subsequent strategy formation step (as they appear to be, given the iconic status of these tools), some unobserved thought process, or change in thought process, must be taking place. Those who begin their analyses with the SWOT or FFF mental image would need to reconfigure their mental model of the problem, something they would learn to do almost unconsciously. The more astute (or experienced) among us, having frequently confronted this kind of problem before, intuitively (from implicit memory) reconfigure it to address each factor or force individually or in some simple combination. 37, 38 The even more intelligent, perhaps, might clump related factors before beginning their analysis, or explicitly search for some common threads or linkages among the various factors or forces. The problem might be reconfigured along the lines of Schematic C in Exhibit 1, where the implications of the interrelationship of two factors are considered in relation to the results of two other interdependent factors.
Depending on the kind of representations evoked in the brain, different associations will elicit different configurations of prior knowledge which, in turn, will activate different parts of the brain and, hence, different memories. 39 Ultimately, given the multiple factors in the initial condition and others triggered from memory, an inductively derived reasoning process should emerge. In contrast, if an individual remained fixated on trying for a dead-end analytical solution where there is not one, brain activation patterns should be different, perhaps occurring within brain regions that support deductive reasoning.
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RELEVANT NEUROCOGNITIVE FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO THINKING AND MEMORY
Investigations in cognitive neuroscience have yielded explanations of how thinking and memory work (the two are wholly interdependent phenomena), and how these processes come about. Findings of these investigations provide further explanations for the inefficacy of SWOT and the FFF for new strategy creation and the importance of mental visualization in making sense of a complex SS. SWOT and the FFF are little more than lists of issues, forces, or factors to consider in the complex task of strategy formation. In effect, these are extrinsic inputs to the brain. Without further instruction on how to proceed, the mental visualization evoked by the SWOT Analysis (i.e., lists) or the FFF (i.e., the hub-and-spoke diagram with "the industry" or "industry rivalry" at the center) becomes important and determines the mental model driving the solution attempt. 41 Individuals will address these SWOT and FFF lists differently from one another. Each item, individually or in some combination, will activate different types of memory and, consequently, different areas of the brain. For example, instructions to address items sequentially or in a certain order will trigger different activation patterns. 42 An attempt to address two or more tasks simultaneously excites different brain regions and produces different activation patterns than performing the same two tasks sequentially. 43 Also, mental performance for engaging in two or more tasks simultaneously will drop compared to the performance for engaging in either task alone. The frontal lobes of the brain are engaged under such conditions in an attempt to coordinate and allocate sufficient attentional resources to handle concurrent tasks successfully; these brain regions are also important for selecting among competing choices in solving problems. However, two tasks that require recruitment of similar areas of the brain will compete for limited resources, and absolute successful performance will be difficult unless the subject can be trained extensively to create a more automatic routine. 44, 45 Regardless of whether these factors are addressed individually or clumped, the four impacting forces or their components in the FFF and the larger number of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats would each (individually or in small groups) be dealt with mentally in a serial fashion. There is no getting away from it: to proceed, mental processes that differ from those conveyed by the original representations must be followed.
It has been known for some time that even simple tasks, such as scanning our memory for information to be recalled, are performed in a serial fashion. 46 For example, subjects that are asked to recall a single letter from a remembered list of six letters will take longer to recall the letter than if the remembered list was three letters. In perceptual tasks, searching for a target within a vast of array of similar targets also is performed in a serial fashion. 47 Simultaneous stimuli are processed less efficiently by the brain than are the same stimuli provided in sequential fashion. 48 Thus, it seems counterintuitive, from a neuroscientific perspective, that a human presented with a difficult problem would be able to simultaneously process all aspects of the factors involved in coming up with a solution, say, to a multivariate strategic problem in a manner analogous to a computer's performance of a multiple regression.
We summarize below some of the key incompatibilities between relevant memory attributes and strategic analysis tools.
• Memories that are the basis of new ideas, solutions, and creations (i.e., strategic options) are spurred by some trigger or association (these rarely come about through a mental leap from nothingness); the trigger is allimportant. Hence, the more vague the trigger, the less likely it is that some meaningful association will come about. In its most common representation, SWOT exists without relevance for any particular aspect of the organization for which it is performed. When SWOT list items are paired, as they often are when using some variant of a TOWS construct, one has, yet again, a mutually exclusive set of more complex relationships (e.g., a strength arrayed against a weakness).
• Memory is wholly dependent on circumstance; it is not static and does not exist without relation to a stimulus. (A stimulus to memory may come from within the brain itself, exemplified by the common experience of something just having "popped" into one's head, seemingly without any extrinsic input.) Even the slightest variant in the stimulus can lead to a different fragment of memory surfacing to the level of consciousnessthis may, in turn, serve as the stimulus that elicits some new memory (i.e., a new idea synthesized from existing or reconfigured memory fragments). The FFF representation suggests mutual exclusivity of each of the forces, more than likely resulting in diminished consciousness-raising within the mind of the strategist.
• Data and information derived from data tend to be clustered ( or clumped) within the mind based on some commonality(s); the composition of a memory cluster is situation-specific and can change materially even with the slightest alteration in situation (i.e., stimulus). Neither the FFF nor SWOT representations even remotely encourage the notion of joint consideration of forces or factors (i.e., mutual exclusivity).
• Multiple stimuli presented concurrently actually cause lower measurable activation patterns within the brain than do the same stimuli presented in serial fashion. Hence, the representations themselves immediately reduce strategic thinking efficiency.
• Finally, at the highest level of consciousness, when we are confronted by complex, nonroutine cognitive tasks, the brain is mainly a serial processor. It is only at lower levels of consciousness-what has been called the preconscious or, further down, the subconscious levels-that the brain exhibits parallel processing capabilities. Hence, the more complex the strategic decision issue and the more factors that must be taken into account, the greater the necessity for mapping out a more serial protocol with explicit triggers to provoke a creative response on the part of the strategic decisionmaker.
This provides a rationale for de-emphasizing the use of SWOT results in strategy formation processes, even once this analysis has been accomplished comprehensively. Indeed, it could be hypothesized that the more strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats are elicited, the less will be the utility in so doing. A similar case can be made regarding the FFF. Without any further protocol or heuristic for handling only the four general forces impinging on the industry, their effects cannot be systematically evaluated. If strategic management texts continue to promote these tools for strategic analysis, caveats concerning the cognitive weaknesses of these techniques ought to be included (as some texts already do), if for no other reason than to reduce the frustration and ego-deflating effect on students (and planners) who are expected to produce strategy from such analytical results.
THE IMPORTANCE OF MENTAL IMAGERY
The capacity to reason through a complex problem is enhanced by its visualization (i.e., mental model), either in depictive or propositional form. 49 In collaborative circumstances particularly, the condition most prevalent in organizations, a commonly shared understanding of the initial problem situation is of critical importance to effective decisionmaking. It has been shown that agreement at the outset of the initial situation and the final goals-the mental model of the situation-is even more important in effective decisionmaking than the ensuing problem-solving protocol followed. 50 In particular, when the initial condition is that of a complex dynamic system, an ability to grasp the system's causal structure and the interdependencies of causative factors improves one's ability to exercise overall system control. 38 The important role of mental image representation (i.e., the construct of a problem as it appears within the brain) in determining the efficacy of high-level, problem-solving heuristics or protocols has been explored extensively at the behavioral level. 51, 52 Mental imagery has been found to be a significant factor in determining the quality of the solution for structured problems 53 and, more recently, in more creative problem solving. 49 It also has been shown that the choice of problem-solving protocol derives from the envisaged mental representation; more importantly, it can bypass the functional fixedness phenomenon. 53 In The War on Terror SS provided above, defining the initial conditions was the subject of the ad hoc search process (recall the locked room with butcher paper adorning the walls) described in the New York Times. Although the locked room does not suggest much interest in sharing understanding of the situation, procedurally the attempt to develop a visualization of this complex problem was laudable. A shared understanding of the initial conditions and goals certainly is unattainable without a recognition of the need to search for such an understanding in the first place.
When used as the basis for the environmental assessment step in the planning process or an industry structure analysis, the SWOT or FFF lists, respectively, define the initial situation. There is no complementary problem-solving protocol and there is no further meaningful indication of interdependencies or causal relationships among the SWOT list items or FFF forces. No analyzable mental model can ensue from these depictions. It would seem that the functional fixedness effect is all but assured.
FINAL THOUGHTS
To date, virtually all decisionmaking studies-whether in cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, neuroeconomics, or economics-have been premised on the existence of alternative decisions, where the problem is a matter of choice. Indeed, a recent issue (May 2007) of the Annals focused on "Current Trends in Decision Making." 54 Decision making was defined as "the processes by which animals (and humans) choose between competing actions on the basis of the expected value, or utility, or their consequences," thus, more or less encompassing the SD, but certainly not the SS problem.
The "unstructured" decision situation per se, where some cognitive process must occur to arrive at decision options, is virtually uncharted territory. 55 Instead, the focus has been on understanding how the brain functions in essentially deductive decisionmaking contexts. 40 Even in neurocognitive experiments, where choices exist but are ill-defined and adaptive decisionmaking is called for, the brain activity detected is very different from what would occur in clear choice contexts. 56 Brain activity when confronted by the SS should differ substantially from both ill-defined and clear choice contexts. It is questionable how much understanding has been gained in cognitive and neurocognitive research that is applicable to the SS.
The correct identification of the obstacles to the use of techniques such as SWOT and the FFF for understanding and analysis of complex situations cannot be overstated. Extensive pedagogy at all levels of education rests on similar types of mental models. In decisionmaking in virtually every domain of human activity, one can conceive of using SWOT Analysis e or one of its variants, notwithstanding its known limitations. The FFF is similarly ubiquitous internationally.
The degree to which mental imagery plays a role in furthering decisionmaking in a highly complex, more ambiguous SS has not been explored and, most likely, cannot be explored through controlled behavioral studies (as employed in the above cited research). The functional fixedness/mental fixation phenomenon, for example, can only be inferred from behavioral experiments alone.
Until very recently, the idea of distinguishing among patterns of brain activity associated with different kinds of high-level thinking would have been inconceivable. Now, with dramatically improved brain imaging techniques, brain activation patterns triggered by even subtle syntax changes in speech (for example, a change in the tense of a sentence) can be discerned; implicit and explicit learning activity can be identified; 57 the efficacy of brain activity in switching between tasks has been deciphered; 43 and the distinct brain regions engaged in the performance of simultaneous and sequential tasks have been determined, 43 among other brain mapping advances. Recent brain mape If one had any doubts as to the universality of SWOT Analysis, one could type the term into an Internet search engine in quotation marks and wade through the resulting 1,860,000 websites. Add to "SWOT Analysis" any object, activity, or place, and it is likely that someone, somewhere in the world, has performed a SWOT Analysis on it. An Internet search for "Five Force Framework" or "Five Force Analysis" with anything that could be considered a business or industry yields similar results.
ping studies examining the occurrence of insight in problem-solving activity have been able to discern the functional fixedness effect. 34 It is necessary to examine brain activation triggered by the attempted application of different strategic analysis protocols. It should be possible to examine brain activity during the application of strategic analysis techniques to the creative act of strategy formation. The identification of appropriate and ineffective visual representations of complex situations, the extrinsic stimuli that facilitate cognition, is the first necessary step to improving the strategy-formation process.
